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Lateral Movement

Scheduled Task Tampering

This article explores techniques for manipulating Windows scheduled tasks through direct registry modifications. Multiple methods were demonstrated to create and modify tasks without generating standard Task Scheduler logging and event records. The techniques include registry manipulation and Event Tracing for Windows (ETW) tampering, which can be used to establish persistence or execute malicious actions while evading detection.

  • 3 Aug 2021

Playing with PuTTY

This article explores techniques for manipulating PuTTY's source code and session sharing mechanism to capture credentials and execute remote commands. Multiple methods are demonstrated for backdooring PuTTY, including capturing user commands, stealing authentication details, and hijacking SSH sessions through named pipe communications. The techniques provide creative approaches for bypassing security controls during adversarial simulations without traditional keylogging methods.

  • 28 Apr 2021

Attack Detection Fundamentals 2021: Azure - Lab #3

This article demonstrates a stealthy method of data collection from an Azure VM by creating a snapshot of a target VM's disk and mounting it to an attack VM. The technique allows accessing sensitive information without directly interacting with the original VM, minimizing detection risks. The lab concludes by highlighting the importance of monitoring Azure activity logs for detecting such lateral movement techniques.

Attack Detection Fundamentals: Discovery and Lateral Movement - Lab #1

This article explores attack detection techniques for discovering valuable users in an Active Directory environment. It demonstrates methods for identifying kerberoastable and AS-REP roastable users through LDAP queries using tools like Rubeus and SharpSploit. Event Tracing for Windows (ETW) logging is used to capture and analyze reconnaissance activities in a cybersecurity lab setting.

Attack Detection Fundamentals: Discovery and Lateral Movement - Lab #2

This article explores techniques for detecting file share enumeration and lateral movement in Windows environments. The lab demonstrates how to use Event Tracing for Windows (ETW) and Windows Event Logs to identify suspicious LDAP queries and file share access patterns. Specific focus is placed on using SharpShares to discover exposed file shares and detect potential security risks, including analysis of Group Policy Preference files.

Attack Detection Fundamentals: Discovery and Lateral Movement - Lab #3

This article explores lateral movement techniques using C3 and Covenant to pivot through file shares in a Windows environment. The lab demonstrates detection strategies by analyzing file share access logs and Event Tracing for Windows (ETW) events to identify suspicious .NET module loading and communication patterns. Key detection techniques include monitoring file share object access logs and tracking anomalous CLR module loading in processes.

Attack Detection Fundamentals: Discovery and Lateral Movement - Lab #4

This article explores lateral movement techniques using PsExec in Windows environments. It details detection strategies for identifying suspicious remote execution activities through Windows event logs and Sysmon telemetry. Key detection opportunities include monitoring service creation events, process creation logs, and named pipe interactions during remote command execution.

Attack Detection Fundamentals: Discovery and Lateral Movement - Lab #5

This article explores lateral movement techniques using Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) in cybersecurity attack detection. The lab demonstrates detection strategies for both native WMIC commands and Impacket's wmiexec tool. Key detection opportunities include analyzing process creation events, network traffic patterns, and examining parent-child process relationships during WMI-based lateral movement attacks.

  • 22 Feb 2019

AutoCAD - Designing a Kill Chain

A detailed analysis of potential cybersecurity vulnerabilities in AutoCAD reveals multiple attack vectors across the cyber kill chain. The research demonstrates how malicious actors can exploit AutoCAD's features like ActionMacros, AutoLisp scripts, and remote text functionality to gain code execution, establish persistence, and perform lateral movement. Multiple attack techniques were identified that could potentially compromise users in high-value industries through targeted AutoCAD-specific exploitation methods.

Enumerating remote access policies through GPO

This article details techniques for enumerating remote access policies in Windows environments through Group Policy Objects. It explores how User Account Control (UAC) and User Rights Assignment (URA) settings impact remote authentication and lateral movement opportunities. PowerView extensions were introduced to help map computer objects with specific remote authentication configurations.

Abusing PuTTY & Pageant through native functionality

A technique for remotely interacting with SSH keys stored in PuTTY's Pageant SSH agent on Windows is explored. The method leverages native functionality to proxy SSH authentication requests through a compromised workstation without traditional exploitation. An attack tool called PageantJacker enables forwarding authentication requests to a remote Pageant instance, allowing an attacker to use a target's SSH keys from their own machine.

The Pageantry of Lateral Movement

A presentation on lateral movement techniques in network penetration testing explores abusing Pageant (PuTTY's SSH agent) on Windows hosts. The talk demonstrates a nearly undetectable method of tunneling SSH agent traffic using a meterpreter extension. Improvements were made to an existing reconnaissance tool to enhance its utility during simulated attacks.