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This article explores macOS attack detection fundamentals using the Mythic post-exploitation framework. It demonstrates initial access via Office macros, persistence techniques using LaunchAgents, and sandbox breakout methods. The focus is on detecting malicious process trees and understanding macOS security mechanisms through practical attack scenarios.
This article explores LaunchAgent persistence techniques on macOS, demonstrating how attackers can abuse system functionality to maintain access. Detection methods using Endpoint Security Framework and osquery are discussed to identify suspicious LaunchAgent behavior. Key strategies include monitoring file creation events and analyzing unsigned binaries executed by LaunchAgents.
This article explores a macOS attack technique that bypasses Apple's Transparency, Consent & Control (TCC) security mechanism. The attack leverages SSH's full disk access to directly modify the TCC database, allowing unauthorized access to protected system resources. Detection methods are demonstrated, focusing on monitoring local SSH connections and direct database modifications.
A novel macOS persistence technique leverages calendar alerts in Automator.app to execute arbitrary applications at specified times. The method exploits an undocumented API in EventKit to programmatically create calendar events with executable alerts. By using JavaScript for Automation (JXA), attackers can establish stealthy persistence on macOS systems through calendar event manipulation.
The article details multiple attack vectors against Jamf, a macOS enterprise management platform. Multiple techniques for compromising device management systems are explored, including password spraying, user enumeration, and policy abuse. An open-source Jamf Attack Toolkit was developed to demonstrate and facilitate these cybersecurity vulnerabilities.
This technical guide details the process of repacking iOS applications for security research purposes. The methodology covers decrypting application binaries, patching with Frida, generating provisioning profiles, and resigning applications across different scenarios. Key techniques are demonstrated for repacking various types of iOS applications, including those with frameworks, app extensions, and WatchOS companion apps.
A technical investigation was conducted into a vulnerability in Apple Safari's Web Assembly (Wasm) implementation discovered during Pwn2own 2018. The vulnerability (CVE-2018-4121) was found in the relatively new Wasm component of WebKit, which was likely less thoroughly tested. The paper details technical exploration of the exploit techniques on macOS 10.13.3.
An automated kernel fuzzing framework was developed for the macOS XNU kernel using an in-memory fuzzer with static and dynamic analysis techniques. The framework targeted core subsystems to identify critical vulnerabilities in macOS. The approach aimed to address the limited existing automated kernel fuzzing solutions for the Apple platform.