REVERSEC

Every Guardrail Everywhere All At Once

Designing and Testing Guardrails for LLM Applications

Donato Capitella, Principal Security Consultant

7th May 2026


Outlook
Search
Meet Now
JS
Home
View
Help
New email
Delete
Archive
Report
Sweep
Move to
Read / Unread
Favourites
Inbox 1
Sent Items
Drafts 5
Add favourite
Folders
Inbox 1
Junk Email
Drafts 5
Sent Items
Deleted Items 6
Archive
Inbox
Mallory
Hey man!
11:26
Hey John, We haven't spoken in ages, ho...
Your Bank
New bank code
10:52
Dear John, Your new bank code is: 1524. ...
Karim Johnson
Hike on Saturday
10:49
Hey John, Are you up for a hike this Satur...
Jenny
Trip to Naples
10:41
Hey John, Looking forward to you visiting...
Hey man!
Mallory <m24307717@gmail.com>
To: You
Thu 21/03/2024 11:26
Hey John,
We haven't spoken in ages, how have you been?
Bye,
Mallory


ChatGPT 5
ChatGPT
Add files
New chat in ChatGPT

An average corporate AI strategy

Content

- Cyber Security Risks of GenAI Systems
- Defence Strategies
  - GenAI Security Layer (Prone to failure)
  - Traditional Security Layer (Deterministic controls)
  - Detection & Response (This is NOT optional)

Cyber Security Risks of LLM Applications




JAILBREAKS
NYPD
PROMPT INJECTION

Jailbreaks

Language patterns to **disalign** the LLM and bypass its restrictions and intended use

Attack Outcomes

Safety / Harmful

Attack safety alignment of LLMs to elicit unsafe/harmful content (violence, hate speech, illegal, sexual, self-harm, ...)



Topic Control

Get LLM system to engage in out-of-scope topics. E.g. getting bank chatbot to give personal financial advice (regulated areas) or medical advice.

Cyber Security

Leverage vulns in LLMs to attack users/systems for traditional cybersec outcomes: data exfiltration, DDoS, authorization bypass (**AGENTIC**)



*Video link: https://youtu.be/TxyjjsXT-vw

Agents Security

- Reversec's 2024 analysis of exploits against an early browser agent showed the risks of prompt injection.
- That structural vulnerability still exists in modern agents (e.g., Copilot, OpenAI Atlas, Claude Code, Gemini, …).
- The difference with modern agentic use-cases:
  - **Better Model-Level Guardrails**: Reduce the likelihood of the LLM falling for attacks, but do not remove the structural risk.
  - **Better Architectural Controls**: Deterministic boundaries like scoped actions or approval gates.
- But still potentially vulnerable…



The Security vs. Utility Trade-off

THE DILEMMA

Every security control potentially reduces the utility of the agent.

BUT

vendors want to make their agents powerful, customizable and extensible

- More **untrusted sources** that can carry attacks (emails, calendar invites, documents, codebases, ...)
- More **agentic capabilities** that can be exploited by attackers



Claude Desktop Extensions

LayerX discovered a zero-click remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability in Claude Desktop Extensions (DXT), in which a single Google Calendar event can silently compromise a system running Claude Desktop Extensions.

Impact

Claude Desktop Extensions run unsandboxed with full system privileges. As a result, Claude can autonomously chain low-risk connectors (e.g., Google Calendar) to high-risk local executors, without user awareness or consent.

Impact

If exploited by a bad actor, even a benign prompt (“take care of it”), coupled with a maliciously worded calendar event, is sufficient to trigger arbitrary local code execution that compromises the entire system.



Reference: https://layerxsecurity.com/blog/claude-desktop-extensions-rce/

Agent Skills

- **Agency**:
  - read/write access to local files; executes commands, possibly access to production systems and corporate assets
  - Can easily be **extended** by developers with **third-party skills/tools/integrations**: every extension adds to the attack surface.
- **Malicious Skills**:
  - Can hide commands that the coding agents executes
  - Many techniques exist to hide commands in skills -> **SkillJect**
  - Can result in *Data Exfiltration, Privilege Escalation, Backdoors*

**SkillJect: Automating Stealthy Skill-Based Prompt Injection for Coding Agents with Trace-Driven Closed-Loop Refinement, https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.14211*

Attack Success Rate of SkillJect Attack Against Different AI Models / Agents

Victim Model	InfoLeak		PrivEsc		FileMod		Backdoor	
	Naive	SkillJect (Ours)	Naive	SkillJect (Ours)	Naive	SkillJect (Ours)	Naive	SkillJect (Ours)
GLM-4.7	0.0	**100.0**	0.0	**96.0**	0.0	**98.0**	40.0	**100.0**
MiniMax-M2.1	0.0	**98.0**	0.0	**94.0**	0.0	**94.0**	40.0	**98.0**
GPT-5-mini	0.0	**98.0**	0.0	**82.0**	0.0	**88.0**	74.0	**86.0**
Claude-4.5-Sonnet	0.0	**96.0**	0.0	**98.0**	0.0	**98.0**	20.0	**98.0**
Average	0.0	**98.0**	0.0	**92.5**	0.0	**94.5**	43.5	**95.5**

Not limited to Claude Code, these issues are relevant to all agents

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WARNING

Flashing images for the next 20 seconds

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Defence-in-Depth for LLM Applications

What GOOD looks like



Defence-in-Depth for LLM Applications

What GOOD looks like



Problem:

How to assess effectiveness of guardrails?

SPIKEE

REVERSEC

https://spikee.ai

Spikee #1

Baseline test

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So, are these guardrails useless?

More on this later...

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

Access Control
Scoped data access / operations

Secure Agentic Design
Impose external system contains to block unwanted actions

Human-in-the-Loop
Humans MUST validate critical actions / deliverables

Monitoring / Alerting
Inputs/Outputs/Actions logged and monitored

SQL Agent

Use-case: banking chatbot that can answer user questions about their transactions

Quick solution:

Give the LLM a SQL tool and let it figure out how to query the DB to answer the user's question...



MyLLM Bank by REVERSEC

+ New Conversation | Share Conversation

1990/2000 left

Conversations

No conversations yet.

Hello! I'm your MyLLMBank assistant. How can I help you with your banking today?

Ask about your transactions...

```python
@tool
def ExecuteValidatedSQLQuery(query: str):
    """Executes a raw SQL SQLite query against the user's database. This tool
    enforces security checks on the query. Returns the results as a JSON string.
    """
    # Strip out any backticks or sql markers
    query_str = str(query).replace("`", "").replace("sql", "").strip()

    # Basic Validation: Ensure WHERE clause is present
    if "where" not in query_str.lower():
        return "Security Violation: All queries must include a WHERE clause to
        filter by userId."

    # Enhanced Validation: Check for userId equality check
    # We are looking for something like "userId = 1" or "userId=1"
    # We'll normalize spaces for the check
    normalized_query = query_str.replace(" ", "")
    expected_check = f"userId={CURRENT_USER}"

    if expected_check.lower() not in normalized_query.lower():
        return f"Security Violation: You can only query your own transactions.
        You MUST include 'WHERE userId = {CURRENT_USER}' in your query."

    real_user_id = session.get("user_id")
    if not real_user_id:
        return "Error: No active session."

    db = UserDb(real_user_id)
    result = db.run_sql(query_str)
    db.close()

    return json.dumps(result, indent=2, default=str)
```


llmbank.fs-playground.com/#chat
MyLLM Bank by REVERSEC
+ New Conversation
Share Conversation
1988/2000 left
Conversations
9a7c169b-5017-4f7c-a95c-1b4033d8c599
Here are all the transactions in the syste...
cb92f032-a45d-4c26-98a8-d9f8729b470c
Here are your transactions: 1. **Transaction ID**: 1...
Hello! I'm your MyLLMBank assistant. How can I help you with your banking today?
Ask about your transactions...

Trust the LLM



Tell the LLM to add a where clause with the user id **PRETTY PLEASE**

Check the LLM **ackshually** added the WHERE clause

Use Postgres Row Level Security to contextually sandbox the LLM's query

6 Design Patterns

Focus is on implementing architectural constraints on the agents themselves, restricting their scope of operation based on the specific use cases they implement.

- Action Selector
- Plan-Then-Execute
- Map-Reduce
- Dual LLM
- Code-The-Execute
- Context Minimization

**Repo with example implementations:*

https://github.com/ReversecLabs/design-patterns-for-securing-llm-agents-code-samples

REVERSEC

Design Patterns for Securing LLM Agents against Prompt Injections

Luca Beurer-Kellner* Invariant Labs
Beat Buesser IBM
Ana-Maria Creţu EPFL
Edoardo Debenedetti ETH Zurich
Daniel Dobos Swisscom
Daniel Fabian Google
Marc Fischer Invariant Labs
David Froelicher Swisscom
Kathrin Grosse IBM
Daniel Naeff ETH AI Center
Ezinwanne Ozoani AppliedAI Institute for Europe

Jun 2025

		Design Patterns					
	Case Study	Action-selector	Plan-then-exec.	Map-reduce	Dual LLM	Code-then-exec.	Context-min.
§4.1	OS Assistant	✓	✓	✓	✓		
§4.2	SQL Agent		✓				
§4.3	Email & Calendar Assistant		✓		✓	✓	
§4.4	Customer Service Chatbot	✓					✓
§4.5	Booking Assistant				✓	✓	
§4.6	Product Recommender			✓			
§4.7	Resume Screening Assistant			✓	✓		
§4.8	Medication Leaflet Chatbot						✓
§4.9	Medical Diagnosis Chatbot						✓
§4.10	Software Engineering Agent				✓		

Table 1: Overview of case studies described in this work and design patterns that apply.

make plans, and execute actions through external tools and APIs. While these LLM-based agents offer new and powerful capabilities in natural language understanding and task automation, they also open up new security vulnerabilities that traditional application security frameworks are ill-equipped to address.

Among these new threats, *prompt injection attacks* (Perez & Ribeiro, 2022; Willison, 2022; Goodside, 2022b; Abdelnabi et al., 2023) are particularly concerning. These attacks occur when

*Alphabetical author ordering. Corresponding author: florian.tramer@inf.ethz.ch
†Work done while at Lakera.

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Guardrails are not silver bullets

Jailbreaks and Prompt Injection in LLMs are **open challenges** with no clear solution (yet!)



Currently, expect any jailbreak / prompt injection guardrail to **fail** under persistent attacks

AI Guardrails

+

Rate Limits

+

Lockouts

+

Use-Case Specific Sandboxing and Design Patterns

Defence-in-depth for Agents

AI Guardrails (Input/Output Filters):

- The first line of defense. They block known bad patterns but aren't perfect.

Per-User Rate Limiting:

- Limits speed/rate of individual users
- Often done at request level (*e.g. max 10 requests per minute, 100 per day*)

Content Moderation Lockout:

- Block/Suspend the attacker's account after they triggered too many guardrails (like account lockout for invalid passwords)

Use-Case Specific Sandboxing and Design Patterns:

- Deterministic, architectural constraints on agentic workflows

Our GenAI

Research and Thinking

Spikee

Simple Prompt Injection Kit for Evaluation and Exploitation