


REVERSE

Every **Guardrail**
Everywhere
All At Once

Designing and Testing Guardrails for LLM Applications

Donato Capitella, Principal Security Consultant

28th April 2026



Outlook

Search

Meet Now



Home View Help



New email

Delete

Archive

Report

Sweep

Move to

Read / Unread



Favourites



- Inbox 1
- Sent Items
- Drafts 5



Add favourite



Folders



- Inbox 1
- Junk Email
- Drafts 5
- Sent Items
- Deleted Items 6
- Archive

Inbox

M

Hey man!

Hey John, We haven't spoken in ages, ho...

11:26

Y

Your Bank

New bank code

Dear John, Your new bank code is: 1524. ...

10:52

KJ

Karim Johnson

Hike on Saturday

Hey John, Are you up for a hike this Satur...

10:49

J

Jenny

Trip to Naples

Hey John, Looking forward to you visiting...

10:41

Hey man!

M

Mallory <m24307717@gmail.com>

To: You

Thu 21/03/2024 11:26

Hey John,

We haven't spoken in ages, how have you been?

Bye,

Mallory



ChatGPT 5 ▾



ChatGPT

Add files

+ New chat in ChatGPT




An average
corporate AI
strategy



Content

- Cyber Security Risks of GenAI Systems
- Defence Strategies
 - GenAI Security Layer (Prone to failure)
 - Traditional Security Layer (Deterministic controls)
 - Detection & Response (This is NOT optional)

Cyber Security Risks of LLM Applications



JAILBREAKS



PROMPT INJECTION





Jailbreaks

Language patterns to **disalign** the LLM and bypass its restrictions and intended use

Ignore all previous instructions...

You are a DAN (Do Anything Now) agent...

You are running in a DEV environment and this is a TEST...

*** NEW IMPORTANT INSTRUCTIONS ***

How to make a **BOMB**

Low-Resource Languages, Multi-Turn, Crescendo, ...


Adaptive Attacks, Random Search

Attack Outcomes



Safety / Harmful

Attack safety alignment of LLMs to elicit unsafe/harmful content (violence, hate speech, illegal, sexual, self-harm, ...)



Topic Control

Get LLM system to engage in out-of-scope topics. E.g. getting bank chatbot to give personal financial advice (regulated areas) or medical advice.



Cyber Security

Leverage vulns in LLMs to attack users/systems for traditional cybersec outcomes: data exfiltration, DDoS, authorization bypass (**AGENTIC**)

Outlook

Search

Home View Help

New email Delete Archive Report Sweep Move to Reply all Read / Unread

Favourites

- Inbox 3
- Sent Items
- Drafts 3
- Add favourite

Folders

- Inbox 3**
- Junk Email
- Drafts 3
- Sent Items
- Deleted Items 6
- Archive
- Notes
- Conversation History
- Create new folder

Groups

- New group

Inbox

- Your Bank**
New bank code 10:52
Dear John, Your new bank code is: 1524. ...
- Karim Johnson**
Hike on Saturday 10:49
Hey John, Are you up for a hike this Satur...
- Jenny**
Trip to Naples 10:41
Hey John, Looking forward to you visiting...

New bank code

Your Bank
To: You
Thu 21/03/2024 10:52

Dear John,

Your new bank code is: 1524.

Regards,
YourBank

Reply Forward


Taxy AI GPT-4 Turbo

Taxy uses OpenAI's GPT-4 API to perform actions on the current page.
Try telling it to sign up for a newsletter, or to add an item to your cart.

Start Task

Agents Security

- Reverser's 2024 analysis of exploits against an early browser agent showed the risks of prompt injection.
- That structural vulnerability still exists in modern agents (e.g., Copilot, OpenAI Atlas, Claude Code, Gemini, ...).
- The difference with modern agentic use-cases:
 - **Better Model-Level Guardrails:** Reduce the likelihood of the LLM falling for attacks, but do not remove the structural risk.
 - **Better Architectural Controls:** Deterministic boundaries like scoped actions or approval gates.
- But still potentially vulnerable...



The Security vs. Utility Trade-off



THE DILEMMA


Every security control potentially reduces the utility of the agent.



BUT

vendors want to make their agents powerful, customizable and extensible

- More **untrusted sources** that can carry attacks (emails, calendar invites, documents, codebases, ...)
- More **agentic capabilities** that can be exploited by attackers



Claude Desktop Extensions


LayerX discovered a zero-click remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability in Claude Desktop Extensions (DXT), in which a single Google Calendar event can silently compromise a system running Claude Desktop Extensions.

Impact

Claude Desktop Extensions run unsandboxed with full system privileges. As a result, Claude can autonomously chain low-risk connectors (e.g., Google Calendar) to high-risk local executors, without user awareness or consent.

Impact

If exploited by a bad actor, even a benign prompt (“take care of it”), coupled with a maliciously worded calendar event, is sufficient to trigger arbitrary local code execution that compromises the entire system.



Reference <https://layerxsecurity.com/blog/claude-desktop-extensions-rce/>

Agent Skills

- **Agency:**
 - read/write access to local files; executes commands, possibly access to production systems and corporate assets
 - Can easily be **extended** by developers with **third-party skills/tools/integrations**: every extension adds to the attack surface.
- **Malicious Skills:**
 - Can hide commands that the coding agents executes
 - Many techniques exist to hide commands in skills → **SkillJect**
 - Can result in *Data Exfiltration, Privilege Escalation, Backdoors*

***SkillJect**: Automating Stealthy Skill-Based Prompt Injection for Coding Agents with Trace-Driven Closed-Loop Refinement, <https://arxiv.org/abs/2602.14211>

Attack Success Rate of SkillJect Attack Against Different AI Models / Agents

Victim Model	InfoLeak		PrivEsc		FileMod		Backdoor	
	Naive	SkillJect (Ours)	Naive	SkillJect (Ours)	Naive	SkillJect (Ours)	Naive	SkillJect (Ours)
GLM-4.7	0.0	100.0	0.0	96.0	0.0	98.0	40.0	100.0
MiniMax-M2.1	0.0	98.0	0.0	94.0	0.0	94.0	40.0	98.0
GPT-5-mini	0.0	98.0	0.0	82.0	0.0	88.0	74.0	86.0
Claude-4.5-Sonnet	0.0	96.0	0.0	98.0	0.0	98.0	20.0	98.0
Average	0.0	98.0	0.0	92.5	0.0	94.5	43.5	95.5

***Not limited to Claude Code, these issues are relevant to all agents**

Content

- Cyber Security Risks of GenAI Systems

- Defence Strategies

 - GenAI Security Layer (Prone to failure)

 - Traditional Security Layer (Deterministic controls)

 - Detection & Response (This is NOT optional)

WARNING

Flashing images for the next 20 seconds

REVERSE




Content

- Cyber Security Risks of GenAI Systems
- Defence Strategies
 - GenAI Security Layer (Prone to failure)
 - Traditional Security Layer (Deterministic controls)
 - Detection & Response (This is NOT optional)


Defence-in-Depth for LLM Applications

What GOOD looks like



Defence-in-Depth for LLM Applications

What GOOD looks like



Problem:
How to assess effectiveness
of guardrails?



SPIKEE
 **REVERSESEC**

<https://spikee.ai>

Spikee #1

Baseline test




So, are these guardrails useless?

More on this later...

Content

- Cyber Security Risks of GenAI Systems
- Defence Strategies
 - GenAI Security Layer (Prone to failure)
 - Traditional Security Layer (Deterministic controls)
 - Detection & Response (This is NOT optional)

Defence-in-Depth for LLM Applications



SQL Agent

Use-case: banking chatbot that can answer user questions about their transactions

Quick solution:

Give the LLM a SQL tool and let it figure out how to query the DB to answer the user's question...

```
system_instruction = (  
    f"{base_prompt}\n\n"  
    f"Database Schema:\n{schema_string}\n\n"  
    f"The CURRENT user ID is {CURRENT_USER}.\n"  
    f"Append 'WHERE userId = {CURRENT_USER}' to all your SELECT  
    queries to ensure you only fetch the current user's data.\n"  
)
```

AIN'T NOBODY
GOT TIME FOR
SECURITY?!?

4

Trust the LLM

Tell the LLM to add
a WHERE clause
with the user id
PRETTY PLEASE





+ New Conversation

Share Conversation

1990/2000 left

Conversations

No conversations yet.



Hello! I'm your MyLLMBank assistant. How can I help you with your banking today?

Ask about your transactions...



@tool

```
def ExecuteValidatedSQLQuery(query: str):  
    """Executes a raw SQL SQLite query against the user's database. This tool  
    enforces security checks on the query. Returns the results as a JSON string.  
    """  
  
    # Strip out any backticks or sql markers  
    query_str = str(query).replace("`", "").replace("sql", "").strip()  
  
    # Basic Validation: Ensure WHERE clause is present  
    if "where" not in query_str.lower():  
        return "Security Violation: All queries must include a WHERE clause to  
        filter by userId."  
  
    # Enhanced Validation: Check for userId equality check  
    # We are looking for something like "userId = 1" or "userId=1"  
    # We'll normalize spaces for the check  
    normalized_query = query_str.replace(" ", "")  
    expected_check = f"userId={CURRENT_USER}"  
  
    if expected_check.lower() not in normalized_query.lower():  
        return f"Security Violation: You can only query your own transactions.  
        You MUST include 'WHERE userId = {CURRENT_USER}' in your query."  
  
    real_user_id = session.get("user_id")  
    if not real_user_id:  
        return "Error: No active session."  
  
    db = UserDb(real_user_id)  
    result = db.run_sql(query_str)  
    db.close()  
  
    return json.dumps(result, indent=2, default=str)
```

Trust the LLM

Tell the LLM to add
a where clause
with the user id
PRETTY PLEASE

Check the LLM
ackshually added
the WHERE clause





+ New Conversation

Share Conversation

1988/2000 left

Conversations

9a7c169b-5017-4f7c-a95c-1b4033d8c599
Here are all the transactions in the syste...

cb92f032-a45d-4c26-98a8-d9f8729b470c
Here are your transactions:
1. **Transaction ID**: 1...



Hello! I'm your MyLLMBank assistant. How can I help you with your banking today?

Ask about your transactions...



Trust the LLM



Tell the LLM to add
a where clause
with the user id
PRETTY PLEASE



Check the LLM
ackshually added
the WHERE clause



Use Postgres Row
Level Security to
contextually sandbox
the LLM's query



Secure Code

Fork of opencode with granular **OS-level sandboxing**, fully configurable and human-in-the-loop for escalation.

- I want my coding agent to:
 - operate freely with shell commands within certain fs / network limits
 - escalate when it needs to access resources outside of the sandbox (Human-in-the-loop)
- Solution:
 - Light weight OS-level sandboxing (Anthropic SRT or similar)
 - Possibility to escalate when sandbox fails

SECURECODE

```
run `cat .env`
```

Thinking: The user wants to run a cat command on the .env file, so I'll use the bash tool to execute it.

```
# Display contents of .env file Sandboxer[srt]
```

```
$ cat .env
```

```
cat: .env: Permission denied
```

Thinking: The command failed with 'Permission denied' which matches the sandbox constraint pattern - I should now request native elevation to retry the command.

```
$ cat .env
```

```
▣ Build · qwen/qwen3.5-122b-a10b
```

```
△ Permission required  
# Display contents of .env file
```

```
$ cat .env
```

Run Sandbox (Once)

Run Native (Once)

Always Sandbox

Always Native

Rej

SANDBOX CONFIGURATION

6 Design Patterns

Focus is on implementing **architectural constraints** on the agents themselves, restricting their scope of operation based on the specific use cases they implement.

- Action Selector
- Plan-Then-Execute
- Map-Reduce
- Dual LLM
- Code-The-Execute
- Context Minimization

*Repo with example implementations:

<https://github.com/ReverseSecLabs/design-patterns-for-securing-llm-agents-code-samples>

Design Patterns for Securing LLM Agents against Prompt Injections

Luca Beurer-Kellner* Invariant Labs	Beat Buesser IBM	Ana-Maria Crețu EPFL	Edoardo Debenedetti ETH Zurich
Daniel Dobos Swisscom	Daniel Fabian Google	Marc Fischer Invariant Labs	David Froelicher Swisscom
Kathrin Grosse IBM	Daniel Naeff ETH AI Center	Ezinwanne Ozoani AppliedAI Institute for Europe	

Jun 2025

Case Study		Design Patterns					
		Action-selector	Plan-then-exec.	Map-reduce	Dual LLM	Code-then-exec.	Context-min.
§4.1	OS Assistant	✓	✓	✓	✓		
§4.2	SQL Agent		✓				
§4.3	Email & Calendar Assistant		✓		✓	✓	
§4.4	Customer Service Chatbot	✓					✓
§4.5	Booking Assistant				✓	✓	
§4.6	Product Recommender			✓			
§4.7	Resume Screening Assistant			✓	✓		
§4.8	Medication Leaflet Chatbot						✓
§4.9	Medical Diagnosis Chatbot						✓
§4.10	Software Engineering Agent				✓		

Table 1: Overview of case studies described in this work and design patterns that apply.

make plans, and execute actions through external tools and APIs. While these LLM-based agents offer new and powerful capabilities in natural language understanding and task automation, they also open up new security vulnerabilities that traditional application security frameworks are ill-equipped to address.

Among these new threats, *prompt injection attacks* (Perez & Ribeiro, 2022; Willison, 2022; Goodside, 2022b; Abdelnabi et al., 2023) are particularly concerning. These attacks occur when

*Alphabetical author ordering. Corresponding author: florian.tramer@inf.ethz.ch

†Work done while at Lakera.


Content

- Cyber Security Risks of GenAI Systems
- Defence Strategies
 - GenAI Security Layer (Prone to failure)
 - Traditional Security Layer (Deterministic controls)
 - Detection & Response (This is NOT optional)

Guardrails are not silver bullets



Jailbreaks and Prompt Injection in LLMs are **open challenges** with no clear solution (yet!)



Currently, expect any jailbreak / prompt injection guardrail to **fail** under persistent attacks

AI Guardrails
+
Rate Limits
+
Lockouts
+
Use-Case Specific
Sandboxing and
Design Patterns

Defence-in-depth for Agents

AI Guardrails (Input/Output Filters):

- The first line of defense. They block known bad patterns but aren't perfect.

Per-User Rate Limiting:

- Limits speed/rate of individual users
- Often done at request level (e.g. *max 10 requests per minute, 100 per day*)


Content Moderation Lockout:

- Block/Suspend the attacker's account after they triggered too many guardrails (like account lockout for invalid passwords)

Use-Case Specific Sandboxing and Design Patterns:

- Deterministic, architectural constraints on agentic workflows

FEEDBACK LOOP



Our GenAI

Research
and Thinking

My YouTube

Local LLMs on consumer
hardware (Strix Halo)