

# Living on the Edge:

Abuse of Microsoft Edge for Persistence

REVERSESEC

# Who uses a Chromium based browsers?



Who uses their  
browser almost every  
time they use their  
computer?

Who knows what a  
Java Applet is?

# WHOAMI

- Alex Brown

- Experience:



- Certs:




- Interests:




# What is persistence?

# Persistence

## Startup folder




## Run Keys




# Persistence

## Office templates



## Outlook homepage



# Persistence



- It's almost a guarantee that when you start your computer you will open a we browser
- Auto installed on all windows machines
- Web browser making web call isn't suspicious





Um...whatcha got there?



A smoothie.

imgflip.com

REVERSE

# Methods

1. Startup\_urls
2. Java Applets
3. Extensions

# Chromium internals

# Browser Settings

The screenshot shows the Microsoft Edge browser settings page. The address bar at the top displays 'edge://settings/startHomeNTP'. The left sidebar is titled 'Settings' and contains a search bar and a list of categories: Profiles, Passwords and autofill, Privacy, search, and services, Appearance, Default browser, Start, home, and new tab page (which is highlighted), Languages, Downloads, Accessibility, System and performance, Reset settings, Extensions, AI innovations, and About Microsoft Edge. At the bottom of the sidebar are 'Send feedback' and 'Managed by your organisation' buttons, along with a note that some settings may be disabled.

The main content area is titled 'Start, home, and new tab page' and is divided into three sections:

- On start-up:** This section has three radio button options: 'Open the new tab page', 'Open tabs from the previous session', and 'Open custom sites' (which is selected). Below these is a 'Sites' list containing one entry: 'Reversesec - offensive-driven cybersecurity consulting services' with the URL 'http://reversesec.com/'. There is an 'Add site' button to the right of the list and a 'Use all open tabs' button below it. A link to 'Clear the list and set it to all currently open tabs' is also present.
- Home button:** This section has a toggle switch for 'Show home button on the toolbar', which is currently turned off. Below the toggle is the text 'Set what the home button opens below:'.
- New tab page:** This section has two toggle switches: 'Copilot new tab page' (turned off) and 'Preload your new tab page' (turned on). Below the 'Copilot new tab page' toggle is the text 'Search, explore the web, and chat with Copilot from one search box in the new tab page'.

# Preferences File

C: > Users > User > AppData > Local > Microsoft > Edge > User Data > Default > JS Preferences > ...

```
4418     "pref_version": 1
4419   },
4420   "created_by_version": "136.0.3240.92",
4421   "creation_time": "13389994331444274",
4422   "edge_crash_exit_count": 0,
4423   "edge_password_is_using_new_login_db_path": false,
4424   "edge_password_login_db_path_flip_flop_count": 0,
4425   "edge_passwords_more_menu_label_shown": true,
4426   "edge_profile_id": "622b724b-442f-46d5-a7f3-ac86c36b0aa2",
4427   "edge_user_with_non_zero_passwords": true,
4428   "exit_type": "Crashed",
4429   "has_seen_signin_fre": true,
4430   "icon_version": 15,
4431   "icon_win11_format": false,
4432   "is_relative_to_aad": false,
4433   "isolated_web_app": {
4434     "install": {
4435       "pending_initialization_count": 0
4436     }
4437   },
4438   "last_engagement_time": "13408736846334463",
4439   "last_time_obsolete_http_credentials_removed": 1758555644.919427,
4440   "last_time_password_store_metrics_reported": 1764237464.510952,
4441   "managed_user_id": "",
4442   "name": "Profile 1",
4443   "network_pbs": {
4444     "3a1abd5": {
4445       "last_updated": "13408711396566912",
4446       "pb": 13
4447     }
4448   }
4449 }
```

# Secure Preferences File


# Secure Preferences File

{ } Secure Preferences ●

C: > Users > User > AppData > Local > Microsoft > Edge > User Data > Default > { } Secure Preferences > ...

```
1319 "protection": {
1320   "macs": {
1394     "search_provider_overrides": "C83A93901F143CAF43E6E6F9096F80660D4AB5C76496BBC648AF08757F1F12A7",
1395     "session": {
1396       "restore_on_startup": "43C42DF0F19E002DB4AB0A94EB56D6A7E1B56B8A6090D2DD49B18C764E389B3C",
1397       "startup_urls": "0F1081291044CD7E162E56B18B75774AD9E1E0CED10F110F16F511D50EB18EA0"
1398     }
1399   },
1400   "super_mac": "F56C60A67AA7DD931F9337C49AB6C1CBEDBC37ED53809306B637D3FC2C1BC457"
1401 },
1402 "session": {
1403   "restore on startup": 4,
1404   "startup_urls": [
1405     "http://reversesec.com/"
1406   ]
1407 }
1408 }
```

# HMAC



<https://cyberhoot.com/cybrary/hmac-authentication/>

# That was until I found

## HMAC and “Secure Preferences”: Revisiting Chromium-based Browsers Security

Pablo Picazo-Sanchez, Gerardo Schneider, and Andrei Sabelfeld

Chalmers University of Technology  
Gothenburg, Sweden,

<https://www.cse.chalmers.se/~andrei/cans20.pdf>

We executed the script on 100 different computers with different OSs (48 Linux, 44 Windows and 8 MacOS) and the results can be seen in Table 2. **Concluding that the seed is not randomly computed as claimed.** Concretely, the seed is: `b'\xe7H\xf36\xd8^\xa5\xf9\xdc\xdf%\xd8\xf3G\xa6[L\xdfv\x00\x0-\xf6rJ*\xf1\x8a!-&\xb7\x88\xa2P\x86\x91\x0c\xf3\xa9\x03\x13ihq\xf3\xdc\x05\x8270\xc9\x1d\xf8\xba\0\xd9\xc8\x84\xb5\x05\xa8'`. We run this experiment on Chrome version 85.0.4172.0.

*Brave, Microsoft Edge and Opera* We executed the same script as for Chrome to extract the seed on Brave, Edge and Opera but we could not change the user's settings. We had then to perform a brute force attack to extract the seed because the file was different than in Chrome. **We got an alarming result** concerning these four vendors: **the seed is the blank string, i.e., seed = b''** in both Windows and MacOS. The version of Microsoft Edge we used was 85.0.564.51, for Brave we used version 1.14.81 (based on Chromium: 85.0.4183.102) whereas for Opera we used version 71.0.3770.148.

# Sorry not in scope

I don't think this is a security vulnerability however.

If you can run code on the user's machine as the user, it is unsurprising that you could beat this.

See [https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+master/docs/security/faq.md#why-arent-compromised\\_infected-machines-in-chromes-threat-model](https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+master/docs/security/faq.md#why-arent-compromised_infected-machines-in-chromes-threat-model) for more details.

Your script could also replace chrome with a fork that does everything chrome does except verify the preferences.


I think Secure Preferences is a best effort attempt at stopping lower-level abuse, not a security guarantee.

I'm going to leave view restrictions for now out of caution, but I think these will be removed once we get confirmation this isn't a security issue.

## Immutable Laws of Security v2

- **Law #1:** If a bad actor can persuade you to run their program on your computer, it's not solely your computer anymore.

# H MAG



# Attack Path



Local Access



```
{} Secure Preferences •
C: > Users > User > AppData > Local > Microsoft > Edge > User Data > Default > {} Secure Preferences > ...
1319   "protection": {
1320     "macs": {
1394       "search_provider_overrides": "C83A93901F143CAF43E6E6F9096F80660D4AB5C76496BBC648AF08757F1F12A7",
1395       "session": {
1396         "restore_on_startup": "43C42DF0F19E002DB4AB0A94EB56D6A7E1B56B8A6090D2DD49B18C764E389B3C",
1397         "startup_urls": "0F1081291044CD7E162E56B18B75774AD9E1E0CED10F110F16F511D50EB18EA0"
1398       }
1399     },
1400     "super_mac": "F56C60A67AA7DD931F9337C49AB6C1CBEDBC37ED53809306B637D3FC2C1BC457"
1401   },
1402   "session": {
1403     "restore_on_startup": 4,
1404     "startup_urls": [
1405       "http://reversesec.com/"
1406     ]
1407   }
1408 }
```

Edit the Secure Preferences file




Edge Loads settings


# Methods

1. Startup\_urls
2. Java Applets
3. Extensions


# 1. Startup\_url



```
{ } Secure Preferences ●
C: > Users > User > AppData > Local > Microsoft > Edge > User Data > Default > { } Secure Preferences > ...
1319     "protection": {
1320         "macs": {
1394             "search_provider_overrides": "C83A93901F143CAF43E6E6F9096F80660D4AB5C76496BBC648AF08757F1F12A7",
1395             "session": {
1396                 "restore_on_startup": "43C42DF0F19E002DB4AB0A94EB56D6A7E1B56B8A6090D2DD49B18C764E389B3C",
1397                 "startup_urls": "0F1081291044CD7E162E56B18B75774AD9E1E0CED10F110F16F511D50EB18EA0"
1398             }
1399         },
1400         "super_mac": "F56C60A67AA7DD931F9337C49AB6C1CBEDBC37ED53809306B637D3FC2C1BC457"
1401     },
1402     "session": {
1403         "startup_urls": [
1404             "http://reversesec.com/"
1405         ]
1406     }
1407 }
1408 }
```



**Fig. 2.** HMAC protocol in Chromium based browsers



**Fig. 2.** HMAC protocol in Chromium based browsers

# Edge runs in background

< System and performance / System

Start-up boost

Opens Edge faster when you start your device. [Learn more](#)



```
def kill_edge():
    """Terminate all running Edge processes."""
    for proc in psutil.process_iter(["name"]):
        if proc.info["name"] and "msedge" in proc.info["name"].lower():
            try:
                proc.kill()
            except Exception:
                pass
```

```
C: > Users > User > AppData > Local > Microsoft > Edge > User Data > Default > JS Preferences > ...
```

```
4417     permission_actions : {},
4418     "pref_version": 1
4419   },
4420   "created_by_version": "136.0.3240.92",
4421   "creation_time": "13389994331444274",
4422   "edge_crash_exit_count": 0,
4423   "edge_password_is_using_new_login_db_path": false,
4424   "edge_password_login_db_path_flip_flop_count": 0
4425 },
4426 "edge_user_with_non_zero_password": true,
4427 "exit_type": "Crashed",
4428 "has_seen_signin_flow": true,
4429 "isolated_web_app": {
4430   "install": {
4431     "pending_initialization_count": 0
4432   }
4433 },
4434 "last_engagement_time": "13408736846334463",
4435 "last_time_obsolete_http_credentials_removed": 1758555644.919427,
4436 "last_time_password_store_metrics_reported": 1764237464.510952,
4437 "managed_user_id": "",
4438 "name": "Profile 1",
4439 "network_pbs": {
4440   "3a1abd5": {
4441     "last_updated": "13408711396566912",
4442     "pb": 13
4443   }
4444 }
4445 }
4446 }
4447 }
4448 }
```

```
"edge_user_with_non_zero_password": true,
"exit_type": "Crashed",
"has_seen_signin_flow": true,
```

## Verify You Are Human

Please verify that you are a human to continue.




### Verification Steps

1. Press Windows Button "Windows" + R
2. Press CTRL + V
3. Press Enter



**Slack brings the  
team together  
wherever you are**

We'll take you to your web browser to sign in and then bring you back here.



**EDGE:**

**SO YOU WOULDN'T JUST DOWNLOAD  
AND RUN CODE FROM A WEBSITE**

**I'M A SECURE BROWSER**

**RIGHT?**

imgflip.com

REVERSE

# 2. Java Applet

# What is a Java Applet


## The Wide World of Applets

### What are Applets?

An applet is a small executable module, that normally doesn't have the complete features and user interface of a normal application. Java is the language most commonly associated with applets. An applet is like a small piece of executable code that needs a full application to contain it. The applet runs inside of the application in a "sand box" or "virtual machine," which is a set of computer resources and instructions that make up an environment for the applet's execution.


### Example


This is an example applet called Photo Album II by Intel Applets. Pretty neat!



<https://lessonplans.btskinner.com/applet.html>

# RuneScape!





1. User selects HTML page with embedded applet.
2. Java bytecode is downloaded by browser and executed by integrated bytecode interpreter.



Um...whatcha got there?



A smoothie.

imgflip.com

REVERSE

# What do we need to make this work?

1. Need to Edge to open the page in IE mode
2. We need the Java Applet to have permissions beyond the Java Sandbox
3. We need the applet to be transparent to the user

# IE pages file

The screenshot shows the Microsoft Edge settings interface. On the left is a navigation pane with options: Default browser, Start, home, and new tab page, Languages, Downloads, Accessibility, System and performance, Reset settings, Extensions, AI innovations, and About Microsoft Edge. The main content area is titled 'Allow sites to be reloaded in Internet Explorer mode (IE mode)'. Below this is a section for 'Internet Explorer mode pages' which contains a table of pages. The table has columns for 'Page', 'Date added', and 'Expires'. One page is listed: 'https://bbc.co.uk/' with a date added of '2025/11/27' and an expiration date of '2025/12/27'. There are also buttons for 'Allow', 'Add a page', and 'Internet Options'.

Default browser

- Start, home, and new tab page
- Languages
- Downloads
- Accessibility
- System and performance
- Reset settings
- Extensions
- AI innovations
- About Microsoft Edge

Allow sites to be reloaded in Internet Explorer mode (IE mode) [?](#) Allow

When browsing in Microsoft Edge, if a site requires Internet Explorer for compatibility, you can choose to reload it in Internet Explorer mode

Internet Explorer mode pages Add a page

These pages will open in Internet Explorer mode for 30 days from the date you add the page. You have 1 page that'll automatically open in Internet Explorer mode

Page	Date added	Expires	
https://bbc.co.uk/	2025/11/27	2025/12/27	

Internet Options

You're in Internet Explorer mode. Most pages work better in Microsoft Edge.

[Open in Microsoft Edge](#)

Welcome to the BBC



### Labour drops plan to give workers protection from unfair dismissal from first day in a job

Employees will instead get the right after six months - the promise was a key pledge in the party's manifesto ahead of last year's general election.

Politics · 368



### Households face 'dismal' rise in spending power, says IFS, as Starmer defends Budget

Business · 3150



### Chris Mason: Starmer could have scrapped child benefit cap last year - why did he wait?

Politics · 922



### Three arrests after BBC investigation into criminal network on High Street

```
"https://bbc.co.uk/": {  
  "date_added": "13408741086854179",  
  "engine": 2,  
  "source": 3,  
  "visit_state": false,  
  "visits_after_expiration": 0  
},
```

# Java Applet Permissions

## What Applets Can and Cannot Do

Java applets are loaded on a client when the user visits a page containing an applet. The security model behind Java applets has been designed with the goal of protecting the user from malicious applets.

Applets are either sandbox applets or privileged applets. Sandbox applets are run in a security sandbox that allows only a set of safe operations. Privileged applets can run outside the security sandbox and have extensive capabilities to access the client.

<https://docs.oracle.com/javase/tutorial/deployment/applet/security.html>


# Java Applet Permissions

☰ policy X

C: > Users > User > .java > ☰ policy

```
1 grant codeBase "http://microsoft.hacker.local/*" {  
2     permission java.security.AllPermission;  
3 };  
4
```

# User Warnings



# deployment.properties

deployment.properties X

C: > Users > User > AppData > LocalLow > Sun > Java > Deployment > deployment.properties

```
1 #deployment.properties
2 #Wed Dec 10 12:43:03 GMT 2025
3 deployment.javapi.lifecycle.exception=true
4 deployment.trace=true
5 deployment.javaws.autodownload=NEVER
6 deployment.version=8
7 deployment.browser.path=C:\\Program Files\\Internet Explorer\\iexplore.exe
8 deployment.security.blacklist.check=false
9 deployment.modified.timestamp=1745595904917
10 deployment.log=true
```

```
14 deployment.cache.enabled=false
```

```
15 deployment.cache.max.size=0
```

```
16 deployment.user.security.trusted.certs=C:/Users/User/.java/trusted.certs
```

```
18 #Java Deployment jre's
19 #Wed Dec 10 12:43:03 GMT 2025
20 deployment.javaws.jre.0.registered=true
21 deployment.javaws.jre.0.platform=1.6
22 deployment.javaws.jre.0.osname=Windows
23 deployment.javaws.jre.0.path=C:\\Program Files (x86)\\Java\\jre6\\bin\\javaw.exe
24 deployment.javaws.jre.0.product=1.6.0_45
25 deployment.javaws.jre.0.osarch=x86
26 deployment.javaws.jre.0.location=http://java.sun.com/products/autodl/j2se
27 deployment.javaws.jre.0.enabled=true
28 deployment.javaws.jre.0.args=
29 |
```



Recycle Bin



Google Chrome



Microsoft Edge



Firefox



Visual Studio 2019



Visual Studio Code



Windows 10 Enterprise Evaluation  
Windows Licence has expired  
Build 18362.19h1\_release.190318-1202



Type here to search



6°C Clear



ENG

23:17

23/11/2025



# Extensions

# Anatomy of an Extension

```
<> index.html  
{ } manifest.json  
JS script.js
```

```
<> index.html X  
{ } manifest.json X  
JS script.js X  
JS script.js > ...  
1  function getWrod() {  
2      fetch("https://random-words-api.kushcreates.com/api?words=1")  
3      .then(res=>res.json())  
4      .then(word=>document.getElementById("randomWord").innerText=word[0]["word"])  
5      .catch(err=>console.log(err))  
6  }  
7  
8  getWrod();  
++  key . 111D1JANDGRYIK103W0BAQLT AAVCAV0AM11D0GRCAQLATEJ0H200D24N1ED1WCJRDCT 15gZ1ng:  
12 }
```

# Very powerful permissions


- Cookies
- History
- Bookmarks
- Clipboard Read & Write
- Debugger
  - *Read and change all your data on all websites.*
- Proxy

Can also run local binaries

**WILD WEST HACKIN' FEST  
@ MILE HIGH 2025**

**THE EXTENDABLES - EXPLOITING  
BROWSER EXTENSIONS FOR  
PRIVESC AND PERSISTENCE**


# Native messaging



<https://blog.chromium.org/2013/10/connecting-chrome-apps-and-extensions.html>

# Silently Installing extensions

- Force Install



- --load-extension

Deprecations

Removing the `--load-extension` flag

The `--load-extension` flag lets you load an unpacked extension from the command line. However, it was commonly abused to load malicious and unwanted software into the browser. To address this, we are [removing the flag](#) in Chrome 137 and providing alternatives for any use cases including testing that still need this capability.

<https://developer.chrome.com/blog/extension-news-june-2025#deprecations>

```
"odfafepnkmbhccpbejgmiehpchacaeak": {
  "account_extension_type": 0,
  "active_permissions": {
    "api": [
      "activeTab",
      "scripting"
    ],
    "explicit_host": [
      "*/chat.openai.com/*",
      "*/chatgpt.com/*"
    ],
    "manifest_permissions": [],
    "scriptable_host": [
      "*/chat.openai.com/*",
      "*/chatgpt.com/*"
    ]
  },
  "commands": {},
  "content_settings": [],
  "creation_flags": 38,
  "disable_reasons": [],
  "events": [],
  "first_install_time": "13408713397901742",
  "from_webstore": false,
  "granted_permissions": {
    "api": [
      "activeTab",
      "scripting"
    ],
    "explicit_host": [
      "*/chat.openai.com/*",
      "*/chatgpt.com/*"
    ]
  }
}
```

# Bypassing allowlisting


Credit to:

# THE PHANTOM EXTENSION: BACKDOORING CHROME THROUGH UNCHARTED PATHWAYS

Written by **Riadh Bouchahoua** - 23/09/2025 - in **Pentest** - **Download** 

<https://www.synactiv.com/en/publications/the-phantom-extension-backdooring-chrome-through-uncharted-pathways>

# Allowlisting Extensions



The screenshot shows the Windows Registry Editor window. The left pane displays the tree structure with 'HKEY\_CURRENT\_CONFIG' expanded to 'Extensions'. The right pane shows a list of registry values. The values are all of type REG\_SZ and their data is a series of alphanumeric strings. The strings are: 1: dapjbgjnjinbpoindlpdmhochffioedbn; 10: mnblgcihmefdidbadceglkknncinmic; 11: jbmcdcfnnpenkgliplbgllfpninigbiml; 14: aobcgffnbkkipbflopnonndoiommhch; 15: aodjmnfhjibkcdimpodiifdjnncaafh; 16: ppnbnpeolgkicgegkbbjmhlideopiji; 17: demelhhnkocnphihjbhpfjnkknkdf; 18: aejoelaoggembcahagimdiliamlcdfm; 19: bkpoemflpiempcejkoifiakljfkbak; 2: nhdogjmejiglipccpnnnanhbledajbpd; 20: nlbjncdgjeocebhnmkbbbdekmmmbfjd; 21: bfjbejmeoibbdpfdmbacmefcbannbg; 22: cjpaldlnbpafamejdnhcphjbkeiagm; 23: ienfalfjdbdpebioblackkekamfmbnh; 24: bcjindccaagfpapjjmafapmmgkkgoa; 25: cmhmcmgkegffbbfobhjpdbimgmoohap; 26: kegeenojcnijgmfgkcokknkbpmjcabdm; 27: jckcakggdpngjmgioiafdkxhnlighpp; 28: idfbldcbbfkggckamnibfbngnbjocf; 29: gbbacdmgjdfajabggllpjifcedoajdimg; 3: lahinifgmgneapocckkainmoandaboo

# How does the browser calculate IDs

- A Chrome Extension ID is the first 32 characters of the SHA256 hash of a public key, where characters 0-9a-f are translated to their respective a-p counterparts.
- The Public key is stored in the manifest.json


AI-powered extensions >



**Grammarly: AI Writing and Gra...**  
 ★★★★★☆ (1.1K)  
 Grammarly for Edge helps you write with confidence. Get AI support for grammar,...



**WeTab 新标签页**  
 ★★★★★☆ (1.3K)  
 Get



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 DeepSeek-R1 Claude 3.5 Gemini  
 Google's Favorite AI extension of 2023  
**Sider: Chat with all AI models (...)**  
 ★★★★★☆ (7.7K)  
 ChatGPT, DeepSeek, Gemini, Claude, Grok all in one AI sidebar, for AI search, read, and...



**DeepL Translate**  
**DeepL: translate and write with...**  
 ★★★★★☆ (705)  
 Translate while you read and write with DeepL Translate, the world's most accurate...




**LanguageTool**  
 Grammar checking for 10+ languages  
**AI Grammar Checker & Paraph...**  
 ★★★★★☆ (575)  
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Editor's pick >



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 ★★★★★☆ (506) • Immersive Translate  
 Free Translate Website, Translate PDF & Epub eBook, Translate Video Subtitles in Bilingual



**Tampermonkey**  
 ★★★★★☆ (5.1K) • Jan Biniok  
 Change the web at will with userscripts



**Avira Password Manager**  
 ★★★★★☆ (88) • Avira  
 Avira Password Manager saves, manages, and syncs all your passwords across all your devices.



**Honey: Automatic Coupons & Rewards**  
 ★★★★★☆ (2.7K) • Honey Science Corporation  
 Automatically find and apply discounts when you shop online!

Boost your productivity >

But there is more

Your browser is managed by your organisation

# Extensions

Search installed extensions

My extensions

Keyboard shortcuts

[Get extensions for Microsoft Edge](#)

Developer mode

Allow extensions from other stores. [Learn more](#)



## Personalise your browser with extensions

Extensions are simple tools that customise your browser experience and offer you more control. [Learn more](#)

### Installed extensions

From Microsoft Edge Add-ons Store

**uBlock Origin**

Finally, an efficient blocker. Easy on CPU and memory.

[Details](#) [Remove](#)

From other sources

**Google Docs Offline**

This extension enhances your offline experience with Google Docs and comes pre-installed on your device.


[Details](#) [Remove](#)

### Find new extensions

[Get extensions for Microsoft Edge](#)

Can't find what you're looking for? You can also get extensions from the [Chrome Web Store](#).

# Warnings about developer mode



# Warnings about developer mode

```
C: > Users > User > AppData > Local > Microsoft > Edge > User Data > Default > JS Preferences > ...  
2115     "pinned_extensions": [],  
2116     "ui": {  
2117         "allow_chrome_webstore": false,  
2118         "dev_mode_warning_snooze_end_time": "13408740024730128"  
2119     }
```

# How to defend

- Startup\_url
  - Create an alert for SPF file for being modified for any other the appropriate browser
- Java applet
  - Disable IE mode
  - Application allowlisting (app locker would be bypassed by local admin)
  - Vulnerability and Patch management – flag old java versions
- Extensions
  - Fully disable extensions – Might be too much for most orgs
  - Force install extensions
  - Manage allowed permissions
  - Prevent access to sites via Runtime block hosts
  - Review installed extensions – We have done assessments like this
  - Identify anomalous chrome extension file locations
  - [Detailed guide to the ExtensionSettings policy | Microsoft Learn](#)

# Disclosure timeline

- A few day ago, Microsoft Security Response Centre (MSRC) reached out to me about this talk to verify that it wouldn't contain any unreported vulnerabilities
  - I replied confirming that it didn't
- MSRC then ask for a preview of my talk
  - I supplied them with a PDF of my slides

**REVERSE**

Thank you

# References

- (2020) *HMAC and “Secure preferences”*: Revisiting chromium-based browsers security. Available at: <https://www.cse.chalmers.se/~andrei/cans20.pdf> (Accessed: 11 December 2025).
- ReverseSecLabs (2025) *ReverseSecLabs/theextendables*, GitHub. Available at: <https://github.com/ReverseSecLabs/TheExtendables> (Accessed: 11 December 2025).
- Bouchahoua, R. (2025) *The phantom extension: Backdooring chrome through uncharted pathways*, Synacktiv. Available at: <https://www.synacktiv.com/en/publications/the-phantom-extension-backdooring-chrome-through-uncharted-pathways> (Accessed: 11 December 2025).
- *Silent chrome extension installation revisited* (no date) Syntax. Available at: [https://syntax-errOr.github.io/Return\\_Of\\_The\\_Extension.html](https://syntax-errOr.github.io/Return_Of_The_Extension.html) (Accessed: 11 December 2025).